Dynamic Carbon-Constrained EPEC Model for Strategic Generation Investment Incentives with the Aim of Reducing CO2 Emissions by Valinejad, Jaber et al.
Northumbria Research Link
Citation:  Valinejad,  Jaber,  Marzband,  Mousa,  Elsdon,  Michael,  Saad  Al-Sumaiti,  Ameena  and 
Barforoushi,  Taghi  (2019)  Dynamic  Carbon-Constrained  EPEC  Model  for  Strategic  Generation 
Investment Incentives with the Aim of Reducing CO2 Emissions. Energies, 12 (24). p. 4813. ISSN 
1996-1073 
Published by: MDPI
URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/en12244813 <https://doi.org/10.3390/en12244813>
This version was downloaded from Northumbria Research Link: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/41756/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access 
the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items can be reproduced, 
displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or 
study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, 
title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata 
page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any  
format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder.  The full policy is available online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/pol  i cies.html  
This  document  may differ  from the  final,  published version of  the research  and has been made 
available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the published version 
of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be required.)
                        

energies
Article
Dynamic Carbon-Constrained EPEC Model for
Strategic Generation Investment Incentives with the
Aim of Reducing CO2 Emissions
Jaber Valinejad 1,*, Mousa Marzband 2, Michael Elsdon 2, Ameena Saad Al-Sumaiti 3
and Taghi Barforoushi 4
1 Bradley Department of Electrical Computer Engineering, Virginia Tech, Northern Virginia Center,
Greater Washington, D.C., VA 22043, USA
2 Department of Maths, Physics and Electrical Engineering, Faculty of Engineering and Environment,
Northumbria University Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 8ST, UK;
mousa.marzband@gmail.com (M.M.); michael.elsdon@northumbria.ac.uk (M.E.)
3 Advanced Power and Energy Center, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Khalifa University,
P.O. Box 127788, Abu Dhabi, UAE; ameena.alsumaiti@ku.ac.ae
4 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Babol Noshirvaini University of Technology,
Babol 4714871167, Iran; barforoshi@nit.ac.ir
* Correspondence: JaberValinejad@vt.edu
Received: 8 November 2019; Accepted: 29 November 2019; Published: 17 December 2019 
Abstract: According to the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, energy system planners are
encouraged to consider the effects of greenhouse gases such as CO2 in their short-term and long-term
planning. A decrease in the carbon emissions produced by the power plant will result in a tax decrease.
In view of this, the Dynamic carbon-constrained Equilibrium programming equilibrium constraints
(DCC-EPEC) Framework is suggested to explore the effects of distinct market models on generation
development planning (GEP) on electricity markets over a multi-period horizon. The investment
incentives included in our model are the firm contract and capacity payment. The investment issue,
which is regarded as a set of dominant producers in the oligopolistic market, is developed as an EPEC
optimization problem to reduce carbon emissions. In the suggested DCC-EPEC model, the sum of
the carbon emission tax and true social welfare are assumed as the objective function. Investment
decisions and the strategic behavior of producers are included at the first level so as to maximize the
overall profit of the investor over the scheduling period. The second-level issue is market-clearing,
which is resolved by an independent system operator (ISO) to maximize social welfare. A real power
network, as a case study, is provided to assess the suggested carbon-constrained EPEC framework.
Simulations indicate that firm contracts and capacity payments can initiate the capacity expansion of
different technologies to improve the long-term stability of the electricity market.
Keywords: emissions; CO2; investment incentives; generation expansion; EPEC; dynamic; planning
1. Introduction
In the quest for improving economic efficiency and promoting sustainable development, electric
power industries have experienced major changes in the regulatory structure over the last few
decades [1–7]. Regarding the generation expansion planning (GEP) and operation decisions by
generation companies (GENCOs), the issue of profitability is critical in terms of strategies offered to
the market (short-term) and the generation capacity expansion (long-term) [8–12]. As one of the key
facilitators of generation capacity expansion is the projected price of electricity in the future, effective
market-clearing models should be used in order to settle the cost of electricity in the short term [13].
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Conversely, one of the major challenges in a global electricity market is to maintain the adequacy of
generation capacity [14–21].
On the one hand, if regulators do not apply appropriate incentive policies, fair energy-based
policies may not encourage producers to invest new generation capacities [22–24]. Considering this,
several countries have built frameworks such as, firm contract, capacity payment, and capacity
obligation systems to monitor power plant investments [25–32]. Appropriate models should be
developed in order to assess the capacity to be installed and also to research the effect of different
market designs on generation capacity.
On the other side, considering the energy generation process, a range of emissions, including SO2,
NOx, are generated in addition to CO2 [33,34]. These greenhouse gases, in particular, CO2, can lead
to climate change in such a way that there is a growing concern about worldwide warming and
climate change [33,35]. As a result, emissions resulting from power plants should be regarded in the
development planning of generation. In addition, in response to carbon emissions, price-based and
quantity-based methods are suggested so that there are incentive systems equipped with feed-in tariffs
with emission trade, a quota obligation, and carbon tax.
A variety of models have already been proposed to model generation expansion planning.
In [36], a static bi-level model using the complementary approach is introduced to investigate the
generation expansion planning issue. In addition, strategic behavior is considered in this model.
In [37], a similar problem defined in [36] is solved via Benders decomposition. This model is
under uncertainties related to non-strategic producers’ decision–making as well as demand growth.
Ref. [38] proposes a model for long-term decisions on wind investment so that different load ranges of
power plants to obtain sustainable electricity market are considered. In [39,40], a static equilibrium
problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) is introduced to model competition among a set of
strategic producers to invest generation units. In [39], a mathematical model is presented so that [40]
encompasses case studies to validate the proposed model. Ref. [41] is somewhat similar to [39] in that
they both use an EPEC model. Contrary to [39], a conjectured-price method is used in [41] to model
market operation. In addition, a dynamic stochastic EPEC model to solve the generation expansion
issue is proposed in [42]. In [43], a dynamic stochastic tri-level model is presented to evaluate functions
of strategic producers in the deregulated market. In addition, the generation planning in some papers
including [44–48] is addressed by considering transmission expansion problems. In [44–46], a tri-level
model to investigate generation and transmission expansion planning is proposed. Ref. [49] models
a multi-carrier energy market by considering investment incentives. In this framework, the strategic
producer can invest in transmission lines, generation units, Combined Heat and Power (CHP), and gas
furnace. Incentives are considered to motivate strategic producers to invest in generation units and
CHP. In [46], the concept of the worst-Cournot–Nash equilibrium is used to model strategic producers
so that this paper aims to address the transmission expansion problem. In the following, the features
of the proposed model in comparison with several related research works are represented:
● The suggested model is dynamic. The dynamic nature of investment decisions has not been
considered in the generation capacity expansion problem in [5,8,21,23,36,37,39–41,44–46,50]. This
is critical for a multi-period stochastic mathematical programming with an equilibrium constraints
(MPEC) model consisting of transmission network constraints.● The GEP model for each strategic producer in this paper is bi-level, but this problem
in [4,14,23], and Refs. [50–52] is not bi-level as typical applications of bi-level approach in
operational planning. Reference [53] presents bi-level models defined as a mathematical
optimization problem constrained by another optimization problem, as this approach is
increasingly applied to electricity markets [8,54].● The transmission constraints are considered in this paper while this issue has been neglected in [30,51].● The competition model is considered between strategic producers and non-strategic producers,
whilst the models presented in [4–6,8,14,19,21,23,50,52,55], have not considered any strategic producer.
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● The scenarios are applied to describe uncertainty pertaining to non-strategic companies, whilst no
uncertainty has been taken into account in [4,14,52,56];● The capacity payment policy is considered as the investment incentive, whilst this has not been
considered in [5,6,8,9,14,19,21,23,36–41,43–46,50,52,54].● The firm contract policy is considered as the other investment incentive, whilst the firm contract
has not been considered in [5,6,8,9,14,19,21,23,36–41,43–46,50,52,54].● The hybrid market including both capacity payment and firm contract is considered,
as simultaneous existence of these two investment incentives has not been considered in [5,6,8,9,
14,19,21,23,36–41,43–46,50,52,54]. Therefore, our method uses the EPEC model for investigating
impacts of the both investment incentives on power generation sector.● The reliability indicators for different markets are taken into account and compared with each
other unlike in previous works [8,14,21,36,37,39–41,43,50,52,54,55].● The demands are considered to be elastic to the price compared to [6,8,14,23,50,52,55].
Figure 1 shows an overview of the proposed structure. Accordingly, the contributions of this
paper are summarized as:✓ Integrating the impact of carbon emissions as well as incentive investments into the Dynamic
carbon-constrained Equilibrium programming equilibrium constraints (DCC-EPEC) model.✓ The effect of different markets is studied in the investment performance of strategic producers in
multi-stage planning by the DCC-EPEC model.✓ Implementing a multi-stage stochastic framework for a generation expansion model for
strategic investors considering non-anticipativity constraints to make the proposed problem
computationally expensive, and likely intractable, especially in the case of large-scale case studies;✓ calculating dynamic reliability indices for investment incentive policies;
b) Firm 
contract 
market 
d) Energy only 
market
a) Hybrid market: 
including both firm 
contract and 
capacity payment
c) Capacity Payment 
market
S: The presence of strategic companies in competing
n: The presence of non-strategic companies in competing
RI: Reliability indices including LOLP, LOLE and LOEE
MCP: market clearing price
N
Uncertainty related 
to investment by 
non-strategic 
producer
Stage r Last stageSecond stageFirst stage
Dynamic EPEC carbon-constrained planning
Figure 1. The effectiveness map of the Carbon-Constrained investment and planning strategies.
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2. Modelling EO, CP, FC, and Hybrid Markets
It is essential to choose the right model for GEP, and investigating the effects of different market
schemes on investment. Different techniques to model existing uncertainties and analyze the behavior
of the market and competitors are considered, and the efficiency of such models in productive
investment is analyzed as below.
2.1. Modeling Behaviour of the Market and Competitors
2.1.1. Market Clearing Model for the Impact of Investment Incentives
The main models that account for the behavior of competitors and the market include game theory,
multi-agent, and system dynamics. The market behavior is modeled using game theory, which is
useful to take account of strategic behavior in the restructured electricity industry. Game Theory
includes a collection of players with different interests. The decisions of each player affect the result
of his game and others [57]. There is a concept called Nash equilibrium in game theory that refers to
the state where no player can achieve more benefit by changing his decision. (Bertrand equilibrium,
Cournot equilibrium, Stackelberg model, conjectural variations, and specifically supply function in
which the decision variables are both of quantity and price nature.) The model accounts for both elastic
and non-elastic loads. In this paper, production and consumption, as well as the costs related to the
operation, market-clearing, and consumers’ suggestions, are modeled using a linear supply function,
assuming loads are price elastic.
Amongst different mathematics that can be formulated for each of these models, including, but not
limited to the MPEC, EPEC, equivalent quadratic problem, and mixed complementary problem, EPEC was
selected [14].
2.1.2. Dynamic Model for the Impact of Investment Incentives
In a static approach, investment decisions and production firms offered on the current market
are entirely independent of previous or future stages, and previous or future effects are not taken
into account. Given the fact that the investments done in a stage can affect investment decisions and
market behavior for future stages, using a dynamic approach to investigate the impact of investment
incentives on strategic corporate behavior is necessary. For this purpose, GEP is done in five stages,
with each stage consisting of several stages. Therefore, the increase in the number of planning stages is
possible and depends on the planner’s decision. In this study, stage by stage load growth and interest
rate were assumed to be 6.2% and 10%, respectively, and mathematical models and simulation results
are provided for each stage.
2.1.3. The Bi-Level Model for Each Strategic Producer Incorporating Market-Clearing and Dynamic Models
The impact of investment incentives in firm contracts and capacity payments on the behavior of
a strategic company in the presence of non-strategic companies is investigated using a two-level model
structure. It is also worth mentioning that both strategic and non-strategic producers can be considered
in the proposed DCC-EPEC model. The goal is to find the best profit for the strategic company in each
of the markets, i.e., Enrgy only (EO), Capcity Payment (CP), Firm Contract (FC), and hybrid models, as
the strategic company’s profit has the highest priority. Therefore, the first-level of the model includes
the long-term behavior of the strategic company as well as an investment with the aim of maximizing
the strategic company’s profits in EO, CP, FC, and hybrid models. Based on this, the strategic company
affects the market-clearing price using its investment offers in the current market.
To obtain more accurate results, the impact of these variables on the current market should be
modeled, and feedback should be received for each investment and offered by the strategic company.
For this purpose, the second-level is related to market-clearing, including the presence of both strategic
and non-strategic companies which takes place to maximize social welfare in each of the markets. Thus,
the goal of the second-level conflicts with that of the first-level. Non-strategic companies are receivers
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of prices in the short term, but they can affect the market-clearing price through their investments.
Reliability parameters are therefore considered and calculated at the end of each stage. In addition to
considering each strategic producer as a bi-level model, the final objective function of the proposed
DCC-EPEC model is used to mitigate CO2 emissions.
2.2. Modeling Uncertainty in the Market
2.2.1. Modeling Existing Uncertainties
GEP can face uncertainties for various reasons as in the competition among companies, forecasted
load demand, fuel price, technical, and economic specifications of new technologies for producing
electrical energy, and the time needed to develop environmental facilities and regulations [58].
The techniques developed to take uncertainties into account include Decision Theory, Scenario Analysis,
Real Options Theory, and Risk Management. In addition, the authors in [59] propose a Polynomial
Chaos approach to model uncertainties in Power Systems. In this paper, the uncertainties involved in
consideration with GEP were modeled using the scenario analysis, as the most appropriate model for
the purpose of different market schemes. Scenarios are sets of possible events as exogenous variables
in specified periods in the future. In this case, there is no forecast, but a set of events that can happen
in the future are analyzed. These scenarios should take the most likely events into account, but, for the
sake of simplicity, the number of scenarios should not be too high. Developed scenarios are used to
analyze different strategies.
2.2.2. Issue of Non-Anticipativity
In dynamic planning while considering uncertainty, the non-anticipitivity conception must be
implemented to model so that the results for scenarios whose conditions are similar to each other must
be equal to each other in each stage of the proposed DCC-EPEC model [60].
3. Problem Formulation
3.1. The Proposed Carbon-Constrained EPEC Model
In this section, the mathematical formulation of the proposed carbon-constrained EPEc framework
is presented. It includes the set of second level problems, i.e., Equations (17)–(31) as well as collection
of first level model, i.e., Equations (3)–(16). The objective of the proposed carbon-constrained EPEC
model is provided by Equations (1) and (2).
lObjective function of carbon-constrained EPEC model:
A variety of objective functions encompassing carbon emission tax, annual true social welfare,
and total profit of strategic producers can be considered as the proposed objective function of the
carbon-constrained EPEC model. Equation (1) presents carbon emission tax while Equation (2) is
related to annual true social welfare. In annual true social welfare, generation costs of the power plants
are considered. These objective functions are as follows:
Objective function: minimizing carbon emission tax:
min ∑
w
∑
r
Wwr∑
t
σrtTCO2[∑
y
∑
i
qCO2i q
S
yrtiw +∑
y
∑
r’
∑
i
qCO2 qSryrr’tiw+∑
y
∑
k
qCO2k q
E
yrtkw +∑
y
∑
i
qCO2i V
FCXyri
+∑
y
∑
r’
∑
i
qCO2i V
FCXryrr’i].
(1)
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Objective function: annual true social welfare:
max ∑
w
∑
r
Wwr( 11+ f)r∑t σrt[∑d bDtdqDrtdw −∑y ∑i CSi qSyrtiw−∑
y
∑
k
CEk q
E
yrtkw −∑
r’
∑
y
∑
i
CSyrr’tiq
Sr
yrr’tiw]. (2)
First-level problem:
As mentioned in Section 2, each of EO, CP, FC, and hybrid markets are considered as bi-level
models, where the first-level includes Equations (3)–(16) aiming at maximizing the profit of strategic
company (Equation (3)):
max −EOPROFIT− FCPROFIT−CPPROFIT. (3)
The objective function (Equation (3)) represents the expected profit (investment cost minus
expected revenue) of the strategic GENCO in the planning horizon, which consist of three terms.
The terms of (Equation (3)) are associated with the net profit of the strategic company in EO, FC, and
CP markets, respectively as for FC and CP markets is equal to the net profit of the strategic company
in the hybrid market where the enumeration of the formulation takes place as:
Energy only:
min EOPROFIT =∑
r
( 1
1+ f)r∑i KyriXyri +∑r’ ( 11+ f)r’∑i ∑r KyriXryrr’i−∑
w
∑
r
Wwr( 11+ f)r∑t σrt[∑i qSyrtiw(λrtnw −Csi )+∑
i
∑
r’
qSryrr’tiw(λrtnw −Cryrr’i)+∑
k
qEyrtkw(λrtnw −CEk)] ∀y.
(4)
Equation (4) is related to the profit of the strategic company in EO market. The first term of profit
function is linked to the investment cost. The second term of profit function is the expected profit
obtained by selling energy in the spot market: Capacity payment:
min CPPROFIT = −∑
w
∑
r
Wwr( 11+ f)r∑t σrt[CCP∑i (1− FORi)(1−VFC)Xyri+CCP∑
r’
∑
i
(1− FORi)(1−VFC)Xryrr’i +CCP∑
k
(1− FORk)PEyk] ∀y. (5)
Equation (5) is the profits resulted from the capacity payments. Both new and existing units are
considered in this policy:
Firm contract:
min FCPROFIT = −∑
w
∑
r
Wwr( 11+ f)r∑t σrt[CFCVFC∑i Xyri+CFCVFC∑
r’
∑
i
Xryrr’i] ∀y. (6)
Equation (6) is related to the profits of the strategic GENCO by selling a pre-determined part of
the supply in a firm contractual market. This policy consider only new units.
First-level constraints:
∑
r
( 1
1+ f)r∑i KyriXyri +∑r’ ( 11+ f)r’∑i ∑r Kyr’iXryrr’i ≤ Ky ∶ ∆y ∀y. (7)
The budget limitations are considered by Equation (32):
bSyrtiw ≥ 0 ∶ ζsrytiw ∀y,∀r,∀t,∀i,∀w. (8)
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bEyrtkw ≥ 0 ∶ ζErytkw ∀y,∀r,∀t,∀k,∀w. (9)
byrr’tiw ≥ 0 ∶ µSrrr’ytiw. (10)
Equations (8)–(10) mean that the offers of the strategic company for its new and existing units are
always positive:
bSyrtiw = bSyrtiw’ ∶ uSrytiw ∀y,∀r,∀w,∀w’ ⊂ {qwr = qw’r},∀t,∀i. (11)
bEyrtkw = bEyrtkw’ ∶ uErytiw ∀y,∀r,∀w,∀w’ ⊂ {qwr = qw’r},∀t,∀k. (12)
bSryrr’tiw = bSryrr’tiw’ ∶ uSryrr’tiw ∀y,∀r,∀w,∀w’ ⊂ {qwr = qw’r},∀r’,∀t,∀i. (13)
Equations (11)–(13) represent the non-anticipativity of the strategic company’s offers in the
current market:
Xyri =∑
h
uyrih ⋅Xih ∀i,∀r,∀y ∑
h
uyrih = 1, uyrih ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i,∀r,∀y. (14)
Equation (14) allows the investor to select among investment options including a null option of
selecting with no variance change in the system:
Xryrr’i = Xyri ∀r, r’ ⊂ {Xr’i > 0, r> r’}, ∀i,∀y. (15)
Cryrr’i = Ci ∀r, r’ ⊂ {Xr’i > 0, r> r’}, ∀i,∀y. (16)
Dynamic dependency constraints on the generation investment decision variables are presented
in Equations (15) and (16).
Second-level problem:
The market-clearing model is provided by Equations (17)–(31).
Second-level objective function:
min ∑
y
∑
i
bSyrtiwq
S
yrtiw +∑
y
∑
k
bEyrtkwq
E
yrtkw +∑
r’
∑
y
∑
i
bSyrr’tiwq
Sr
yrr’tiw−∑
d
bDtdq
D
rtdw ∀r,∀t,∀w. (17)
The minimization of the minus social welfare is represented by Equation (17), for each
second-level problem.
Second-level constraints:
∑
d
qDrtdw + ∑
m∈φnbnm(θrtnw − θrtmw)−∑y ∑i qSyrtiw −∑y ∑r’∑i qSryrr’tiw−∑
y
∑
k
qEyrtkw −∑
y
∑
i
VFCXyri −∑
y
∑
r’
∑
i
VFCXryrr’i = 0 ∶ λrtnw ∀n,∀t,∀r,∀w. (18)
Equation (18) presents the power balance at each node.
σrt[∑
y
∑
i
qCO2i q
S
yrtiw +∑
y
∑
r’
∑
i
qCO2i q
Sr
yrr’tiw+∑
y
∑
k
qCO2k q
E
yrtkw +∑
y
∑
i
qCO2i V
FCXyri
+∑
y
∑
r’
∑
i
qCO2i V
FCXryrr’i] ≤ LCO2t ∶ µCO2rtw ∀r,∀t,∀w.
(19)
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Equation (19) provides the carbon emissions allowance in the age of green economy for each time
block according to energy generation procedure:
0 ≤ qSyrtiw ≤ (1−VFC)Xyri ∶ µSyrtiw,µSyrtiw ∀y,∀i,∀t,∀r,∀w, (20)
0 ≤ qSryrr’itw ≤ (1−VFC)Xryrr’i ∶ µSryrtiw,µSryrtiw∀y,∀r,∀r’ ⊂ {Xr’s > 0, r > r′},∀t,∀i,∀w. (21)
0 ≤ qEyrtkw ≤ qEyk ∶ µEyrtkw,µEyrtkw ∀y,∀k,∀t,∀r,∀w. (22)
0 ≤ qDrtdw ≤ qwrqDtd ∶ µDrtdw,µDrtdw ∀d,∀t,∀r,∀w. (23)
− Fnm ≤ bnm(θrtnw − θrtmw) ≤ Fnm ∶ Vrtnw, Vrtnw ∀n,∀m,∀t,∀r,∀w. (24)
pi ≤ θrtnw ≤ pi ∶ ζrtnw, ζrtnw ∀n,∀t,∀r,∀w. (25)
Equations (21)–(25) provide power bounds for of generation units, DC power flow, and
angle bounds.
θrtnw = 0 ∶ ζ1t n=1,∀t,∀r,∀w. (26)
Equation (26) sets the voltage angle of the reference bus.
qSyrtiw = qSyrtiw’ ∶ uSyrtiw ∀y,∀r,∀w,∀w’ ⊂ {qwr = qw’r},∀t,∀i. (27)
qEyrtkw = qEyrtkw’ ∶ uEyrtkw ∀y,∀r,∀w,∀w’ ⊂ {qwr = qw’r},∀t,∀k. (28)
qSryrr’tiw = qSryrr’tiw’ ∶ uSryrr’tiw’ ∀y,∀r,∀w,∀w’ ⊂ {qwr = qw’r},∀t,∀i. (29)
qDrtdw = qDrtdw’ ∶ uDrtdw ∀r,∀w,∀w’ ⊂ {qwr = qw’r},∀t,∀d. (30)
θrtnw = qrtnw’ ∶ ζrtnw’ ∀r,∀w,∀w’ ⊂ {qwr = qw’r},∀t,∀n. (31)
Equations (27)–(31) show non-anticipativity for all second-level variables.
4. Inputs and Outputs of Each Level for Different Markets
The inputs and outputs for first- and second-level optimization for EO,CP,FC, and hybrid markets
related to DCC-EPEC model is pesented in the Figure 2.
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Figure 2. The inputs and outputs for first- and second-level optimization for EO, CP, FC, and hybrid
markets related to Dynamic Carbon-Constrained EPEC model.
4.1. Inputs and Outputs of Each Stage
Inputs of the first-level of the EO market include I(U) = qCO2i , q
CO2
k , T
CO2
t , Kyri, Ky, Xih, C
S
i , C
E
k .
Inputs of the CP market include I(U), and I(CP) = CCP, FORi, FORk. Inputs of the FC market include
I(U), and I(FC) = VFC, CFC. Inputs of Hybrid markets include the inputs of EO, CP, and FC markets.
The variables of the first-level (outputs) include:
W(U) = (Xyri, uyrih, bESyrtkw, bSyrtiw). (32)
At the second-level, these variables have specific amounts and are parametric. Inputs of the
second-level of EO market include W(U) and I(L) = LCO2t , q
CO2
i , q
CO2
k , qrw, σrt, Ww, q
D
td, q
E
yk, b
D
rtd, bmn,
Fnm. Input of the second-level of FC include W(U), I(L) and VFC. Variables of the second-level (outputs)
include W(L) = qEsyrtkw, q
S
yrtiw, P
Sr
yrr’tiw, q
D
rtdw, λrtnw, θrtnw. The W(L) includes variables of the first-level
as well.
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4.2. Stage to Stage Inputs and Outputs
The inputs of each stage from the previous stage or stages of planning include Xyrr’i{r:r-1,r-2,⋯, 1},
Cryrr’i{r:r-1,r-2,⋯, 1},and f.
5. The Pseudo-Code of Algorithm for Solutions for Investment Problems in Different Markets
The pseudo-code for solving the problem proposed in Figure 1 is presented in Algorithm 1. First,
the pseudo-code for the market type is specified.
The DCC-EPEC model aims to reduce carbon emissions. The aim of the investment problem in
the first-level is to maximize the net profit of the strategic producer in the planning horizon. Each
new unit is considered as an existing unit in the stages after construction. At first, social welfare is
maximized in the first stage for every scenario and demand block. In this case, the firm contract and
hybrid markets affect the power balance constraint because they have the incentive firm contract in
their policies. The part of consumption is supplied by the firm contract policy. The constructed unit
for using the incentive firm contract must supply the part of the consumption in the next stages after
construction. The DC power flow is used in the second-level model. The operation problem on the
second-level is considered as the first-level constraint in different stages. Reliability parameters are
calculated at the end of each stage.
Converting the dynamic DCC-EPEC market model into equivalent single-level models by
enforcing Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) and primal-dual transformation and related linearization
technique are provided in detail in the Appendix A.
Algorithm 1 The algorithm for solving the suggested DCC-EPEC Model
Require: Input data ▷ uncertainty related to non-strategic producer s investments and demand growth, as well as network
information, Market features, elastic demands
1: W← 1 ▷ scenario of uncertainty relation of investment non-strategic producer
DCC-EPEC Objective function ▷minimizing carbon emissions incurred by power plants
First-level Objective function ▷ profit from the operation of existing units according to the kind of market
2: while r ≤ rn do
3: while w ≤ Wn do
4: t← 1
5: Max first-level objective function
6: if new power plant is invested then It is considered as existing unit for next stages in network
7: e=e+na
8: for r=r+1 do
9: end forOutput ▷ investment and offers by strategic producer
10: Input of second-level ▷ demands bids and Offers and new investments by non-strategic GENCO in scenario w
11: while t ≤ tn do Max social welfare in second-level (operation planning)
12: if market have FC policy then Considering supply resulted from firm contract in power balance according to
FC policy
13: end ifDC power flow Output ▷ Production, consumption and market-clearing price
14: T← t+1
15: W←w+1
16: end while
17: end ifCalculation Reliability indices encompassing LOLP, LOLE and LOEE in stage r
18: end while
19: r← r+1
20: end while
6. Case Study
In this section, accuracy of the proposed framework is investigated using the following case study.
The results are discussed in both monopoly and oligopoly competition.
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6.1. Inputs of Case Study
6.1.1. Introduction of the MREC Transmission Network
The studied network was the Mazandaran regional electricity transmission company (MREC) as part
of the integrated power distribution network of Iran. The single-line diagram for MREC is shown in Figure 3.
The system includes 22 buses, 11 production units, 23 transmission lines, and 12,400/230 kV transformers.
Per unit susceptance of transmission lines with the basic susceptance of 100 MVA, transmission
capacity in MW, susceptance of existing transformers, and capacity of existing production units and
their operating costs are presented in Figure 3. It is assumed that the planning horizon of stage
5 contains three different load blocks, i.e., off-peak, shoulder peak, and peak, the specifications of
which are presented in Figure 3. The candidates for investments are 230 kV buses of Kordkoy, Gorgan,
Darya Sar, and Minoodasht. The capacity of new units for investment is presented in Figure 3 with the
available investment budget assumed to be 150 MD.
The generation expansion planning has become a complex issue by entering the power generation
industry into the competitive space, which is done with the aim of improving economic efficiency.
The meaning of a strategic company as a price maker is that it can influence the market price. In the
real world, there are usually some generation companies that have a more important rule to supply
energy. In lots of cases, they have more effect on the market-clearing price compared to other smaller
generation companies. The method of modeling these companies in the optimization problem is that
the decisions of investment of these companies (new production capacity) along with offer price for
selling in the wholesale market are considered in the market-clearing price. Thus, considering the effect
of new production capacity and strategic company offer price to the market in the model proposed in
this paper has been taken into consideration in the method of modeling the strategic company.
In some of the real markets, production companies are informed of the type of production
technology of the competitors. This fact is not customary in competitive markets. Thus, the presented
model in this paper is from the point of view of system regulator in which the objective is the dynamic
study of investment in electricity generation in a market, including price maker generation companies.
Thus, the system regulator by being aware of that in the electricity market under its supervision.
Strategic companies must take into account their strategic interactions in modeling. Because of this,
the model proposed in this paper has presented a suitable tool for dynamic market study from the point
of view of the system regulator. Mentioning this point is essential that the model result, specifically
the companies’ investment decision can be put at their disposal by the regulator and so the generation
companies also use the presented model output.
6.1.2. Inputs of Investment Incentives for CP and FC
As explained, four policies were considered to assess the impact of investment incentives on
production development planning, and market economic indicators. Energy Only, Capacity Payment,
Firm Contract, and hybrid (including Capacity Payment and Firm Contract) markets are investigated
in this section. The detailed discussion regarding concept of capacity payment and firm contracts from
an economic point of view is provided in [7,49].
It is assumed that, for FC and hybrid markets, 10% of the capacity of the new units in the contract
is initially assumed as purchased. The payment rate for a preparedness factor in capacity is assumed
to be 5 (D/MW) and capacity payment includes all plants (both new and existing). It is assumed that
the volume and rate of FC and the rate of CP are constants during the planning at all stages. The rates
of forced outage for new and existing units are assumed to be 0.03 and 0.05, respectively. The results of
the simulation of the proposed method are presented below.
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Figure 3. Single-line diagram of Mazandaran Regional Electric Company (MREC) power transmission network.
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6.2. Analysis of EO, CP, FC, and Hybrid Markets on MREC Power Transmission Network for Competition
between One Strategic Producer and Non-Strategic Producers
In a monopoly case, for simplicity, four scenarios are assumed for investments by non-strategic
companies, which is shown in Figure 4. The consideration of a large number of scenarios is easily
applicable to the model. As the investments by non-strategic companies are modeled by uncertainty,
all scenarios are supposed to be identical in all markets for comparative observation of impact
between different markets on the investment performance of the strategic producer. It is assumed that
non-strategic companies’ offers are equal to their operating costs. In this article, problem variables in
both the first and the second-levels are identical for different scenarios in the first stage of programming
in all markets. In the second stage, values of variables in scenarios 1, 3, and 4 are identical. In the third
phase, values of variables for scenarios 1 and 4 are identical.
Scenario (Probability)
Scenario 1 (10%)
Scenario 2 (50%)
Scenario 3 (25%)
Scenario 4 (15%)
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5
400 mw peak investment on ALIABAD by offer (Block1: 200 mw by 14.72 (€/
MWh) -Block 2: 200 MW by 15.2 (€/MWh))
No investment
Figure 4. Different scenarios for investment of non-strategic companies.
Figure 5 shows the strategic company’s location and capacity in different market structures.
It can be seen that most of the investments are made in the western region of the network due to
the lack of production in this area. Economic indicators related to the strategic company’s net profit,
social welfare, and net surplus of strategic and non-strategic companies for each of the EO, CP, FC,
and hybrid markets in different planning stages are shown in Figure 6. Figure 7 shows the average
price for markets in various stages of planning.
In dynamic planning, the average market price is affected by demand growth, investments of
companies, and market type. The average market price in the first stage was 23.45 D/MWh due to
the strategic investment of the strategic company. In the second stage, the average price decreased by
2.22 percent, and the total production of competitors increased by 74.78 percent. In the third stage, the
average market price decreased by 20.89 percent, given the investment of competitors. In addition,
a 38% increase was seen in the production of new units of strategic companies. Social welfare and
net consumer surplus increased by 5.31 and 64.336 percent, respectively, but net producer surplus
increased as much as 20 percent due to a lower average market price. In the fourth and fifth stages,
a 400 MW plant will be built on the Daryasar bus by other investors. In the fourth stage, the market
noticed an increase of 7 percent in the average market price compared to the third stage. This is because
of a 6.2 growth in demand and a 27.82 percent decrease in the production of the strategic company’s
existing units. In the fifth stage, with an increase of 9.38% in the strategic company’s existing units,
the average market price increased to 8.68%.
Figure 8 shows net consumer surplus based on energy usage and peak load in various stages
of planning.
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Figure 8. Net consumer surplus based on energy consumption in various stages of planning alongside
peak loads.
Figure 9 summarizes results for MREC network showing the total investment capacity (TC: MW),
average market prices (AP: D/MWh), total energy consumption (EC: MMWh), total profit of strategic
company (SP: MD), total social welfare (SW: MD), total net surplus of strategic company (SS: MD),
total net surplus of non-strategic companies (OS: MD), and total net consumer surplus (CS: MD).
The analysis of EO, CP, FC, and hybrid markets are shown in Figure 5–9 as follows:
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Figure 9. Summary of generation expansion for EO, CP, FC, and hybrid markets.
6.2.1. EO Market
In the EO market, the total investment capacity by the strategic company during the planning
period is 800 MW (peak technology). The average market price during the entire planning period is
26.01. Investment decisions affect the market price, as well as other economic indicators, such as social
welfare, net consumer surplus, and net producer surplus. These economic indicators are reported in
Figures 6, 8, and 9. In this regard, energy consumption, total social welfare, and total net consumer
surplus were equal to 76.46 MMWh, 959.03 MD, and 138.39 MD respectively.
According to the results, the average market price in the different buses (local prices) during
peak and shoulder load periods vary due to transmission constraints. However, during off-peak
times, the average market price in all buses is the same. During the off-peak period in the first
stage of planning, the consumers’ demand is provided by units with lower operating costs, so that
strategic company’s offers are equal to operating costs of competitor units (i.e., 18.6 D/MWh). Strategic
company’s offers during off-peak periods in the last stage of planning period reached 14.72 D/MWh
due to investment by competing firms (peak unit with the operating cost of 14.72 D/MWh).
6.2.2. CP Market
The total investment capacity by the strategic company during the planning period is 2250 MW.
The technologies of all units are at peak due to lower investment costs compared to the basic technology.
The CP market encourages the strategic company to invest in the peak unit. Indeed, this technology
was invested in by the strategic company in the EO market as well. Among various capacities of
peak units, the investor is interested in the highest possible capacity where the establishment of
high-capacity units is limited to the amount of available investment.
The total profit of the strategic company in proportion to its market value increases significantly
so that the total profit on the CP market is 2.3 times higher than that of the EO market. The total net
consumer surplus increases 19.97% compared to its value on the market due to an increase in energy
consumption (1.12%) and a decrease in market price (3.73%). The profit of the strategic company
depends on average market price, amount of production by units, and the composition of production
by units on the network. Simulation results show that by raising payment rates for preparedness
capacity, the strategic company’s profit is raised. Due to a 19.9% increase in net consumer surplus
and 3.27% increase in net producer surplus, social welfare increases by 0.69%. Social welfare also
depends on demand, market-clearing price, and the operating cost of units. Therefore, if the market
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clearing price reduces, the social welfare in the CP market increases proportionally to its value in the
EO market.
6.2.3. FC Market
The total capacity of the new plants built by the strategic company in the FC market is equal to
4050 MW with the technology of all units considered as peak for EO and CP markets. In addition,
the investor in the FC market as in the CP market is interested in the establishment of the maximum
capacity units due to the budget constraints.
The total profit of the strategic company in the FC market increases by 31.69% relative to its CP
market value. Strategic company’s net surplus on the FC market increased by 26.37% and 22.36%,
respectively, compared to its values on the EO and CP markets. The increase in the strategic company’s
net surplus is due to its share in the production and supply of consumers’ demand in the FC market.
However, the net surplus of non-strategic companies on the FC market is lower among all markets
due to the reduction of production in these units compared to the rest of the markets. In addition,
the net consumer surplus increased by 55.77% compared to the CP market. In total, the net consumer
surplus in the FC market has the maximum value (258.63 MD) among all markets due to higher
energy consumption and lower average market price. Social welfare on the FC market is higher than
in other markets. In general, the increase in social welfare on the FC market compared to the EO
market is expected in the long term, although it may decrease in the short term due to investments.
Simulations show that the strategic company’s offers in the shoulder load period, and especially in the
off-peak period, is reduced compared to non-strategic companies leading to a decrease in the average
market price. Figure 10 shows the changes in the production of units in proportion to changes in the
volume of the FC. The production of non-strategic companies has increased by increasing the volume
of the FC.
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Figure 10. Units’ production in terms of firm contract’s volume.
Figure 11 shows the capacity invested by the strategic company for different amounts of FC
volume at different stages. The technology of all these units is considered as peak. In addition, the total
constructed capacity by the strategic company reduces by increasing the FC volume.
Energies 2019, 12, 4813 18 of 35
1
2
3
4
510%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Stage (year)
Volume of firm contract
In
ve
st
m
en
t (
M
W
)
Figure 11. Capacity constructed by strategic producer as a function of contract volume.
Figure 12 shows the strategic company’s profit for different values of FC volume. The strategic
company’s profit increases by the increase in FC volume. The rate of investor profit decreases by an
increase in the FC volume (i.e., with the increase in the FC volume, the slope decreases).
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
Volume of firm contract
Pr
of
it(
M 
Eu
ro
)
Figure 12. Strategic producer’s profit in terms of firm contract volume.
6.2.4. Hybrid Market
The total capacity of the strategic company’s new units in this market equals 2050 MW of peak
technology. Due to budget constraints, the maximum possible capacity is selected by the strategic
company for investment. Construction of peak units on the hybrid market with the highest possible
capacity is due to statement (FCPROFIT+ CPPROFIT) in the objective function:
✓ The total profit of the strategic company in the hybrid market increases by 76% compared to
the FC market despite a 1500 MW decline in the strategic company’s investment. The strategic
company’s profit in the hybrid market is 3.89 and 1.82 times as much as that in the EO and CP
markets. The net surplus of the strategic company in this market increased by 74%, 22.73%,
and 0.29% compared to its value on the EO, CP, and FC markets, respectively.
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✓ Social welfare on the hybrid market increases by 11.95% and 11.19%, respectively, compared to
its values on the EO and CP markets. Net consumer surplus in the hybrid market decreases by
34.97% due to an increase of 7.66% in the market price. Therefore, social welfare in this market
decreases by 2.65% compared to its value in the FC market.✓ The total consumer surplus is 138.39 MD, 166.03 MD, 258.63 MD, and 168.17 MD for the EO, CP,
FC, and H designs accordingly. As a result, FC market is assumed as the most appropriate policy
for consumers.✓ Net surplus of non-strategic companies on the EO market increases by 14.49%, 61.77%, and 22.37%
respectively compared to the EO, CP, and FC policies. Therefore, the EO market is better for
non-strategic companies in the long run.✓ Strategic company’s profit in the hybrid policy is 3.89, 1.82, and 1.76 times higher than that in the
EO, CP, and FC policies. Therefore, the hybrid market is better for the strategic company.✓ Table 1 provides the reliability indices of GEP planning for different markets during the planning
period. Investment incentives improve network reliability significantly. In the absence of
investment in one stage, indices of reliability increase over the previous stage due to the growth
in load. In the case of the same investments in different policies, reliability depends on a potential
investment, and power consumption, and the number of new units.
Table 1. Reliability indices of the MREC power system. Reliability indices include Loss of Load
Probability (LOLP), Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE), and Loss of Energy Expectation (LOEE).
Year Market Design LOLP (%) LOLE (day/year) LOEE (MMWh)
1
Energy 1.02 3.71 0.0244
Capacity payment 0.00239 0.0087 0.0000618
Firm contract 0.0318 0.116 0.000908
Hybrid 0.00176 0.0064 0.0000779
2
Energy 1.03 3.77 0.0321
Capacity payment 0.00118 0.0043 0.0000346
Firm contract 0.0338 0.123 0.000893
Hybrid 0.00374 0.0137 0.0000779
3
Energy 1.1 4.02 0.0579
Capacity payment 0.003147 0.0115 0.0000880
Firm contract 0.0419 0.153 0.00168
Hybrid 0.00563 0.0206 0.000204
4
Energy 1.18 4.30 0.0697
Capacity payment 0.00326 0.0119 0.0000889
Firm contract 0.00133 0.005 0.0000381
Hybrid 0.0119 0.0435 0.000411
5
Energy 1.22 4.44 0.0818
Capacity payment 0.0137 0.005 0.0000389
Firm contract 0.0003627 0.00048 0.0000032
Hybrid 0.00318 0.134 0.000962
6.3. Results of Competition between Strategic Producers
In this research, the 230 kV network is intended to be a bus to alleviate the computational burden
so that two strategic Generation Companies (GENCOs) compete with each other in the duopoly market,
where strategic GENCOs 1 and 2 own generation units of Neka and Aliabad, respectively. In addition,
the carbon emission coefficients are set at 0.21 and 0.35 for peak units and base units, respectively [61].
The carbon tax charge is also envisaged to be 12 D/ton-carbon for the lifetime of the power plant [62].
The ultimate goal is to minimize carbon emissions by limiting carbon emissions to 0.3 Mton, 0.14 Mton,
and 0.08 Mton for peak, shoulder, and off-peak time blocks. The limit for carbon emissions is therefore
0.52 Mton for the whole year.
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It is noted that, where the objective function is only to minimize carbon emissions,
the market-clearing price may not be at the highest possible value, which is equal to the minimum
bid price of the demands. In order to obtain the largest possible rates for a meaningful equilibrium,
we consider the profit of all strategic producers multiplied by a tiny factor (e.g., 0.001) to be the
complete tax on carbon emissions in the objective function.
• Energy only: For EO strategy, only strategic producer 2 invests in new peak power plants to
build 200 MW in the fourth year of planning in Sari and 300 MW in the fifth year of planning
in Aliabad. In this case, the carbon emission for the whole year is 52,000 tons, which is equal
to the highest level allowed. Social welfare and total productions are 74.3 MDand 3.57 MWh,
respectively, with a capital cost of 7.09 MD. It is also noted that the average market clearing price
is 33,551 D/MWh.
• Firm contact: In the context of FC strategy, where the volume of the firm contract is to be 10%,
strategic producer 1 is encouraged to invest in 800 MW of peak units in Neka in year 5. On the
other hand, strategic producer 2 invests in 300 MW of peak power in the first year in Sari and
200 MW in the fourth year in Aliabad. Thus, the total investment of producers in the FC policy
is increased by 160% compared to that of the EO policy due to the firm contract; accordingly,
the investment expense in the FC policy is increased by 317%. Social welfare is also improved by
299%. In addition, the Available Capacity In Planning Duration (ACIPD) [55] in the FC policy is
2700 MW; that of the EO strategy, on the other hand, is equivalent to 700 MW.
When the volume of the firm contract is increased by 20%, strategic producer 2 invests 200 MW of
peak units 1 year as compared to the previous year. In this situation, social welfare is boosted by
41.54 percent. In addition, social welfare improves by 37.1% when the amount of the agreement is
increased by 10%. There is a carbon emission restriction when the quantity of the firm contract
exceeds 30%. The carbon emission limits have therefore risen to 4, 2, and 1 Mton for peak, shoulder,
and off-peak time blocks, respectively. In this case, when the volume of firm contract policy is
30%, strategic producer 1 is encouraged to invest 700 MW in Sari and 1000 MW in Neka, all in
the fifth year. Investment cost for volumes of firm contract 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%,
and 100% is equal to 29.83 MD, 29.83, 29.83, 26.86, 29.18, 29.55, 28.54, and 29.27 MD accordingly.
As a consequence of the budget restriction, it is clear that there is no special change in investment
costs. In addition, the social welfare connected with each of these volumes is 235.24, 288.53, 341.82,
363.32, 440.34, 499.21, 534.24, and 598.80 MD, respectively. Social welfare is observed to improve
as the volume of the firm contract rises. In addition, the total carbon emission for each volume
is 2.41, 2.96, 3.51, 3.73, 4.48, 4.82, 5.39, 5.9 Mton, respectively. Understandably, the quantity of
total carbon emissions rises with a rise in the volume of the firm contract. For each case, ACIPD
is equal to 3000 MW, 3000 MW, 3000 MW, 2700 MW, 2900 MW, 2800 MW, 2800 MW, and 2800
MW, respectively. It is noted that there is no particular shift to the ACIPD caused by a budget
restriction. With an increase in the budget, it is observed that the ACIPD has risen.
• Capacity payment: In CP policy, strategic producer 1 invests 1900 MW of peak units in Sari and
Neka so that the amount of ACIPD, in this case, is 2900 MW. As a result, CP policy ACIPD
rises by 2200 MW compared to EO policy. As peak units have reduced carbon emissions,
strategic producers are encouraged to invest in this type of technology. Social welfare in CP policy
is equivalent to 74.39 MD, while carbon emissions are equivalent to 0.75 Mton.
• Hybrid market: In the hybrid market, strategic producer 1 invests 200 MW in Neka in the first
year and 200 MW in Sari in the third year. Strategic producer 2 also invests 200 MW of peak units
in the first year. As a consequence, ACIPD is 2600 MW in the Hybrid market. The amount of
carbon emissions and social welfare is 1.2 MTon and 130.38 MD, respectively; following that, it
is observed that the amounts of carbon emission and social welfare are increased by 63%, and
75%, compared to those of the CP market, As a result, these amounts have risen compared to
those of the EO policy. It is observed that no particular change in ACIPD, social welfare, and
carbon emissions has occurred with a rise in the carbon emission restriction as a result of the lack
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of a budget to spend. When the budget is expanded to 150 MD, the social welfare and carbon
emissions are equivalent to 342.2 MDand 3.42 MTon, respectively.
The suggested dynamic carbon-restricted EPEC model is resolved for four distinct market types,
i.e., EO, CP, FC, SH, while the competition may be monopoly or oligopoly. The MREC power
transmission network, as a real case study, is selected to explore the effectiveness of this framework.
The suggested model is resolved using the GAMS Solver XPRESS software (IBM ILOG CPLEX Solver,
11.0.1, Armonk, NY, USA). Plus, this solver’s optimality gap is set to be equal to zero for all cases.
When the competition is changed from monopoly to oligopoly, the computational burden increases
considerably. As a result, the carbon-restricted oligopoly market requires significantly higher CPU time
than the monopoly market. There is a need to decrease the CPU time of the carbon-restricted oligopoly
model by using decomposition methods and other suitable methods. In addition, according to the
outcomes, the SH model requires more CPU time compared to any suggested market. Similarly,
the computational burden of CP and FC models is higher than that of the EO market.
Since the amount of φSDrtw does not differ in the results of the equilibria, the appropriate value for
φSDrtw is selected to decrease the computing burden by using trial and error. Therefore, φ
SD
rtw is presumed
to be 25 σrt. The amount of σrt for the three considered demand blocks are equivalent to 1489.2, 4380,
and 2890.8, respectively. Complementary constraints resulting from KKT conditions are nonlinear.
In this paper, to linearize complementary constraints, big-M reformulation is used. The amount of M is
chosen by trial and error. It is worth mentioning that, if it is not properly calibrated, the branch-and-cut
solution algorithm is very slow and inefficient.
7. Conclusions
Considering the energy generation process, a range of emissions, including CO2, SO2, and NOx,
are generated. These greenhouse gases, in particular, CO2, can lead to climate change in such a way that
there is a growing concern about worldwide warming and climate change. According to the European
Union Emissions Trading Scheme, energy system planners are encouraged to consider the effects of
greenhouse gasses such as CO2 in their short-term and long-term planning. A decrease in the carbon
emissions produced by the power plant will result in a tax decrease. Hence, in this paper, the proposed
DCC-EPEC is presented to investigate its economic and environmental impact, to address the social
and environmental protection measures. In this model, the effect of different market structures based
on GEP in the production investment strategies is investigated for the power markets over a multi-stage
period. Investment incentives considered are CP, and FC policies, as investigated on the Mazandaran
regional electric company power transmission network. In the proposed DCC-EPEC model, the sum
of the carbon emission tax, and true social welfare are assumed as an objective function. Investment
decisions and the strategic behavior of producers are included at the first level in order to maximize
the overall profit of the investor over the scheduling period. The second-level issue is market-clearing,
which is resolved by an independent system operator (ISO) to maximize social welfare. The results of
this paper are summarized as follows:
• The results illustrated that the FC, CP, and hybrid markets encouraged investment in the peak
unit. Constructing units with maximum capacities according to the available investments are
recommended for the considered markets to improve the reliability indices.
• The energy the new strategic units produce in the FC market is increased compared to the
CP market.
• With the increase in the volume of the FC, total investment capacity by the strategic company is
reduced. It is emphasized that the technology of all units reaches its peak to maximize the sharing
capabilities of non-strategic companies.
• The amount of total carbon emission increases with an increase in the volume of the firm contract.
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• No specific change in ACIPD, social welfare, and carbon emissions occur with an increase in
carbon emission limitation if there is no more budget to invest. In fact, there is a connection
between budget, carbon limitation, and volume of firm contracts in the planning.
• The strategic company’s profit can be increased by optimal volume and rate of FC, which in turn
increases the strategic company’s profit. In summary, the FC market policies are observed to lead
and to be the most optimal in terms of social welfare for consumers and non-strategic companies
in the long run as well as hybrid market and also being better suited for the strategic counterparts.
In the proposed DCC-EPEC model, the amount of M is chosen by trial and error. If it is not
properly calibrated, the branch-and-cut solution algorithm is very slow and inefficient. There is
a need to overcome this challenge. In addition, the computational burden of the proposed model is
another big challenge that can be made for future research. Considering Probabilistic Power Flow by
using the Hierarchical Adaptive Polynomial Chaos-ANOVA Method can also be done for the next
step [63,64]. In addition, modeling the proposed DCC-EPEC into the multi-career energy market is of
interest. In addition, the authors suggest considering electric vehicles and their effect on planning in
the proposed model.
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Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
Indices
r/r′ stage index
t demand blocks index
y strategic company index
i/k index of new/existing power plants owned by strategic company
d index for demand
w/w′ scenario index
h new unit capacity index
n/m bus index
Parameters
σrt weight of demand block t in stage r
Ww weight of scenario w
qrw demand growth in year r and scenario w
Kyri annual investment cost of the new generating unit (D/MW)
Ky total budget of strategic generation company y for investment (MD)
Xih option h for investment capacity of new unit i (MW)
qEyk capacity of existing generation unit k of strategic generation company y (MW)
qDtd maximum load of demand d in block t (MW)
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CSi /CEk marginal cost of new/existing unit of strategic GENCO (D/MWh)
bDrtd price bid of demand d in demand block t and year r (D/MWh)
bmn susceptance of line n–m (p.u.)
Fnm transmission capacity of line n–m (MW)
f discount rate
VFC/CFC firm contract volume/price (Percent)/(D)
CCP capacity payment price (D)
FORi/FORk forced outage rate of new/existing unit (Percent)
qCO2i /qCO2k CO2 coefficient of existing/new units (Ton/MWh)
LCO2t limit of CO2 emission (Ton)
TCO2 amount of tax of CO2 emission (D/Ton)
Decision variables
Xyri capacity investment of new unit i of the strategic generation company y in stage r (MW)
uyrih binary variable that is equal to 1 if the h
th investment option of technology i is selected in stage
r, otherwise it is equal to 0
qEsyrtkw/qSyrtiw power produced by existing/new unit k/i of strategic generation company y (MW)
Xyrr’i/PSryrr’tiw available Capacity/Power produced of new unit i of strategic generation company y in year r′,
in years after the installation in year r (MW)
qDrtdw demand d, in stage r (MW)
bESyrtkw/bSyrtiw offer of strategic GENCO y in market-clearing for its existing/new unit k/i (D/MWh)
bSryrr’tiw offer of strategic GENCO y for its new unit i, in market-clearing related to the stage r
′, in the
stages after the Construction in stage r (D/MWh)
λrtnw market-clearing price (D/MWh)
Cryrr’i marginal cost of new unit of GENCO i, in stage r
′, in the stages after the installation in stage r
(D/MWh)
θrtnw voltage angle
Appendix A
The converting the proposed DCC-EPEC framework to MILP model is explained step by step
as follows:
Appendix A.1. Converting the DCC-EPEC Market Model into Equivalent Single-Level Models
For this purpose, first, the bi-level of each strategic producer model was converted into
mathematical programming equilibrium constraints by using primal-dual transformation. Afterwards,
to covert equilibrium programming equilibrium constraints to a single model, KKT conditions are
exploited. In addition, the resulting single-level problem was linearized using linearization methods.
The proposed problem was solved using the GAMS solvers for MIP model, as presented in Figure A1.
Further elaboration associated with each step of conversion using primal-dual transformation and
KKT conditions, and also linearization are presented in the following.
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Figure A1. Converting the DCC-EPEC problem into a one-level problem.
Appendix A.2. Implementing Primal-Dual Transformation to the Second Level
At the first step, to convert the second level problem (Equations (17)–(31)) into equivalent
constraints, primal-dual transformation is used. The constraints equivalent to the second level of
dynamic carbon-constrained EPEC model encompass primal constraints, dual constraints, and the
strong duality equality. Each kind of equivalent constraint is provided in the following.
Appendix A.2.1. Dual Constraints
It is noted that Ly is assumed to be the Lagrangian function of the second level.
The equations obtained by a derivative of Lagrange expression to decision variables are equivalent
to dual constraints of primal-dual transformation in the DCC-EPEC model:
∂Ly
∂qSyritw
= bSyritw − λyritw + µSyritw − µSyritw −uSryritw+ ∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qwr=qw’r})u
S
yrtiw’ +uCO2rtw σrtqCO2i = 0 ∶ ρSrytiw ∀y,∀r,∀t,∀i,∀w. (A1)
∂Ly
∂qEyrtkw
= bErtiw − λrtnw + µEyrtkw − µEyrtkw −uEyrtkw+ ∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qwr=qw’r})u
E
yrtiw’ + µCO2rtw σrtqCO2k = 0 ∶ ρEyrtkw ∀y,∀r,∀t,∀k,∀w. (A2)
∂Ly
∂qDrtdw
= −bDtd + λrtnw + µDrtdw − µDrtdw −uDrtdw+ ∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qwr=qw’r})u
D
yrtdw’ = 0 ∶ ρDrtdw ∀r,∀t,∀d,∀w. (A3)
∂Ly
∂qSryrr’itw
= bSryrr’itw − λrtnw + µSryrtiw − µSryrtiw −uSryrr’itw+ ∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qwr=qw’r})u
Sr
yrr’itw + µCO2rtw σrtqCO2i = 0 ∶ ρSryrr’itw
∀y,∀r,∀r’ ⊂ {Xr’s > 0, r>r’},∀t,∀i,∀w.
(A4)
∂Ly
∂θrtnw
=∑
m
bnm(λrtnw − λrtmw)+∑
m
bnm(Vrtnmw −Vrtnmw)+∑
m
bnm(Vrtnmw −Vrtnmw)+ ζrtnw − ζrtnw − ζrtnw∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qwr=qw’r})ζrtnw’ + (ζ1rtw)∣n=1 = 0 ∶ ρθrtnw ∀r,∀t,∀n,∀w.
(A5)
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Appendix A.2.2. The Strong Duality Equality of the Second Level Problem
The strong dual equality is as follows:
∑
y
∑
i
bsytriwq
s
yrtiw +∑
y
∑
k
bEytriwq
E
yrtkw +∑
r’
∑
y
∑
i
bSyrr’tiwq
S
yrr’tiw −∑
d
bDtdq
D
rtdw+∑
y
∑
i
(1−VFC)XyriµSyrtiw +∑
y
∑
i
∑
r’
(1−VFC)Xryrr’iµSryrtiw +∑
y
∑
k
qEykµ
E
yrtkw +∑
d
qwrq
D
tdµ
D
rtdw+∑
n
∑
m
Fnm(Vrtnmw +Vrtnmw)+∑
n
pi(ζ
rtnw
+ ζrtnw)+LCO2t µCO2rtw = 0 ∶ φSDrtw ∀r,∀t,∀w.
(A6)
Appendix A.2.3. Primal Constraints
Primal constraints including Equations (A7)–(A20) are the same as second level equations with
new dual variable for using in the next conversion using KKT conditions. The dual variable of each
equation is written in front of that:
∑
d
qDrtdw + ∑
m∈ψΦnbnm(θrtnw − θrtmw)−∑y ∑i qSyrtiw−∑
y
∑
r’
∑
i
qSryrr’tiw −∑
y
∑
k
qEyrtkw −∑
y
∑
i
VFCXyri −∑
y
∑
r’
∑
i
VFCXryrr’i = 0 ∶ λ′rtnw∀n,∀t,∀r,∀w.
(A7)
σrt[∑
y
∑
i
qCO2i q
S
yrtiw +∑
y
∑
r’
∑
i
qCO2i q
Sr
yrr’tiw+∑
y
∑
k
qCO2k q
E
yrtkw +∑
y
∑
i
qCO2i V
FCXyri
+∑
y
∑
r’
∑
i
qCO2i V
FCXryrr’i] ≤ LCO2t ∶ µ′CO2rtw ∀r,∀t,∀w.
(A8)
0 ≤ qSyrtiw ≤ (1−VFC)Xyri ∶ µ′ syrtiw,µ′ syrtiw ∀y,∀i,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A9)
0 ≤ qsryrr’tiw ≤ (1−VFC)Xryrr’i ∶ µ′ sryrtiw,µ′ sryrtiw ∀y,∀r,∀r’ ⊂ {Xr’s > 0, r> r’},∀t,∀r,∀w. (A10)
0 ≤ qEyrtkw ≤ qEyk ∶ µ′ Eyrtkw,µ′ Eyrtkw ∀y,∀k,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A11)
0 ≤ qDrtdw ≤ qwrqDtd ∶ µ′ Drtdw,µ′ Drtdw ∀d,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A12)
− Fnm ≤ bnm(θrtnw − θrtnw) ≤ Fnm ∶ V′rtnmw, V′rtnmw,∀n,∀m,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A13)
−pi ≤ θrtnw ≤ pi ∶ ζ′rtnw, ζ′rtnw,∀n,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A14)
θrtnw = 0 ∶ ζ′t , n = 1,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A15)
qSyrtiw = qSyrtiw’ ∶ u′ syrtiw ∀y,∀r,∀w,∀w’ ⊂ {qwr = qw’r},∀t,∀i. (A16)
qEyrtkw = qEyrtkw’ ∶ u′ Eyrtkw ∀y,∀r,∀w,∀w’ ⊂ {qw’r = qw’r},∀t,∀k. (A17)
qsryrr’tkw = qyrr’tkw’ ∶ u′ sryrr’tiw ∀y,∀r, w, w’ ⊂ {qwr = qw’r},∀t,∀i. (A18)
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qDrtdw = qDrtdw’ ∶ u′ Drtdw ∀r,∀w, w’ ⊂ {qwr = qw’r},∀t,∀d. (A19)
θrtnw = θrtnw’ ∶ ζ′rtnw ∀r,∀w, w’ ⊂ {qwr = qw’r},∀t,∀n. (A20)
It is worth mentioning that dual variables of inequality constraints must have non-negative values:
µS
yrtiw
≥ 0 ∶ µSyrtiw ≥ 0 ∶ ηSrytiw, ηSrytiw ∀y,∀i,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A21)
µsr
yrr’tiw
≥ 0 ∶ µsryrr’tiw ≥ 0 ∶ ηsrrr’ytiw, ηsrrr’ytiw ∀y,∀i,∀t,∀r, r’ ⊂ {Xr’s > 0, r> r’},∀w. (A22)
µE
yrtkw
≥ 0;µEyrtkw ≥ 0 ∶ ηErytkw, ηErytkw ∀y,∀k,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A23)
µD
rtdw
≥ 0;µDrtdw ≥ 0 ∶ ηDrtdw, ηDrtdw ∀d,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A24)
Vrtnmw ≥ 0; Vrtnmw ≥ 0 ∶ ηVrtnmw, ηVrtnmw ∀r,∀t,∀n,∀m,∀w. (A25)
µCO2rtw ≥ 0 ∶ µ′CO2rtw ∀r,∀t,∀w. (A26)
η
rtnw
≥ 0; ηrtnw ≥ 0 ∶ µηrytnw,µηrytnw ∀r,∀t,∀n,∀w. (A27)
Appendix A.3. Enforcing Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) Conditions to the New First Level Model
Now, the second level and first level problems are merged into one model as a new first level
problem. As a next step, the KKT condition is implemented to the first level objective function
including Equations (3) to (6) and to first-level new constraints including Equations (A1)–(A27), and
Equations (7)–(16). Therefore, the new model is:
DCC-EPEC objective function:
Equation (1) or Equation (2). (A28)
First-level objective function:
Equations (3)–(6). (A29)
First-level new constraints:
Equations (A1)–(A27), Equations (7)–(16). (A30)
In the following, each equivalent constraint obtained by implementing KKT conditions for the
new first level model is presented in detail.
Appendix A.3.1. Primal Equality Constraints
These constraints’ KKT conditions encompass the equality constraints of Equation (A31):
Equations (11)–(13), Equations (A1)–(A7), Equations (A16)–(A20). (A31)
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Appendix A.3.2. Constraints Obtained from the Derivative of the Related Lagrangian Term to
Decision Variables
Ly is the Lagrangian term of the new first level model.
∂Ly
∂Xyri
= −∑
w
Wwr( 11+ f)rKyri −∑w Wwr( 11+ f)r∑t σrtCFCVFC−∑
w
Wwr( 11+ f)r∑t σrtCCP(1− FORi)(1−VFC)+∑w∑t + ( 11+ f)r’Kyri∆y+φSDrtw(1−VFC)µSyrtiw −∑
w
∑
n
∑
t
VFCλ’rtnw −∑
w
∑
t
(1−VFC)µ′Syrtiw = 0 ∀y,∀r,∀i.
(A32)
∂Ly
∂Xryrr’i
= −∑
w
Wwr( 11+ f)rKyri −∑w Wwr( 11+ f)r∑t σrtCFCVFC−∑
w
Wwr( 11+ f)r∑t σrtCCP(1− FORi)(1−VFC)+ ( 11+ f)r’Kyr’i∆y+∑
w
∑
t
φSDrtw(1−VFC)µsryrr’tiw −∑
w
∑
n
VFCλ’rtnw −∑
w
∑
t
(1−VFC)µ′Sryrr’tiw = 0∀y,∀r,∀r’ ⊂ {Xr’s > 0, r> r’},∀i.
(A33)
∂Ly
∂qSyrtiw
= −Wwr( 11+f)rδrt(λrtniw −CSi )− λ′rtniw + µ′ syrtiw − µ′ syrtiw −u′ syrtiw+ ∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qw’r=qw’r})u
′ s
yrtiw’ − bSytriwφSDrtw + σrtqCO2i µCO2rtw = 0 ∀y,∀r,∀t,∀i,∀w. (A34)
∂Ly
∂qEyrtkw
= −Wwr( 11+f)rδrt(λrtn(k∈n)w −CEk)− λ′rtn(k∈n)w + µ′ Eyrtkw − µ′ Eyrtkw −u′ Eyrtkw+ ∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qw’r=qw’r})u
′ E
yrtkw’ − bEytrkwφSDrtw + σrtqCO2k µCO2rtw = 0 ∀y,∀r,∀t,∀k,∀w. (A35)
∂Ly
∂qDrtdw
= λ′rtnw + µ′ Drtdw − µ′ Drtdw −u′ Dyrtdw + ∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qw’r=qw’r})u
D
yrtdw’
+φSDrtwbDtd = 0 ∀r,∀t,∀d,∀w. (A36)
∂Ly
∂qsryrr’itw
= Wwr( 11+f)rδrt(λrtniw −Cryrr’i)− λrtniw + µsryrr’tiw − µsryrr’tiw −usryrr’tiw+ ∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qw’r=qw’r})u
sr
yrr’tiw’ + σrtqCO2i µCO2rtw = 0 ∶ −bsryrr’iwφSDrtw
∀y,∀r,∀r’ ⊂ {Xr’s > 0, r> r’},∀t,∀i,∀w.
(A37)
∂Ly
∂θrtnw
=∑
m
bnm(λ′rtnw − λ′rtmw)+∑
m
bnm(V′rtnmw −V′rtnmw)+∑
m
bnm(V′rtnmw −V′rtnmw)+ ζ′rtnw − ζ′rtnw − ζ′rtnw∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qw’r=qw’r})ζ
′
rtnw’ + (ζ′1rtw)∣n=1 = 0 ∀r,∀t,∀n,∀w. (A38)
∂Ly
∂byrtiw
= −η
rytiw
− ηSrytiw + ∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qw’r=qw’r})η
S
rytiw’ + ρSrytiw
−φSDrtwqSyrtiw = 0 ∀y,∀r,∀t,∀i,∀w. (A39)
∂Ly
∂bEyrtkw
= −ηE
rytkw
− ηErytkw + ∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qw’r=qw’r})η
E
rytkw’ + ρErytkw
−φSDrtwqEyrtkw = 0 ∀y,∀r,∀t,∀k,∀w. (A40)
∂Ly
∂bsryrr’tiw
= −ηsr
yrr’tiw
− ηsryrr’tiw + ∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qw’r=qw’r})η
sr
rr’ytiw’ + ρsrrr’ytiw − φSDrtwqsryrr’tiw = 0
∀y,∀r,∀r’ ⊂ {Xr’s > 0, r> r’},∀t,∀i,∀w. (A41)
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∂Ly
∂λrtnw
= −Wwr( 11+f)rδrt ∑
i(i∈n)qSyrtiw + ∑i(i∈n)∑r’ qsryrr’tiw + ∑k(k∈n)qEyrtkw]+∑
i
ρSrytiw +∑
i
∑
r’
ρsrrr’ytiw +∑
k
ρErytkw −∑
d
ρDrtdw+∑
m
bnm(ρθrtnw − ρθrtmw) = 0 ∶ ∀r,∀t,∀n,∀w.
(A42)
∂Ly
∂µ
CO2
rtw
= +∑
y
∑
i
ρSyritwσrtq
CO2
i +∑
y
∑
k
ρEyrktwσrtq
CO2
k +∑
y
∑
i
∑
r’
ρsryrr’itwσrtq
CO2
i
+φSDrtwLCO2t − µ′CO2rtw = 0∀r,∀t,∀w. (A43)
∂Ly
∂µSyrtiw
= ρSrytiw − ηSrytiw + φSDrtw(1−VFC)Xyri = 0∀y,∀r,∀t,∀i,∀w. (A44)
∂Ly
∂µS
yrtiw
= −ρSrytiw − ηSrytiw = 0∀y,∀r,∀t,∀i,∀w. (A45)
∂Ly
∂uSyrtiw
= ρSrytiw − ∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qw’r=qw’r})ρ
S
rytiw’ = 0∀y,∀r,∀t,∀i,∀w. (A46)
∂Ly
∂ηEyrtkw
= −ρEyrtkw − µEyrtkw + φSDrtwPEyk = 0 ∀y,∀r,∀t,∀k,∀w. (A47)
∂Ly
∂µE
yrtkw
= −ρErytkw − ηErytkw = 0∀y,∀r,∀t,∀k,∀w. (A48)
∂Ly
∂uEyrtkw
= ρErytkw − ∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qw’r=qw’r})ρ
E
rytkw’ = 0 ∀y,∀r,∀t,∀k,∀w. (A49)
∂Ly
∂µDrtdw
= ρDrytdw − ηDrytdw + φSDrtwqw’rPDtd = 0 ∀r,∀t,∀d,∀w. (A50)
∂Ly
∂µD
yrtdw
= −ρDyrtdw − ηDyrtdw = 0 ∀r,∀t,∀d,∀w. (A51)
∂Ly
∂uDrtdw
= ρDyrtdw − ∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qw’r=qw’r})ρ
D
rytkw’ = 0 ∀r,∀t,∀d,∀w. (A52)
∂Ly
∂µsryrr’tiw
= −ρsryrr’tiw − ηsryrr’tiw + φSDrtw(1−VFC)Xryrr’i = 0∀y,∀r,∀r’ ⊂ {Xr’s > 0, r> r’},∀t,∀i,∀w. (A53)
∂Ly
∂µsr
yrr’tiw
= −ρsryrr’tiw − ηsryrr’tiw = 0∀y,∀r,∀r’ ⊂ {Xr’s > 0, r> r’},∀t,∀i,∀w. (A54)
∂Ly
∂usryrr’tiw
= ρsryrr’tiw − ∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qw’r=qw’r})ρ
sr
rr’tkw’ = 0
∀y,∀r,∀r’ ⊂ {Xr’s > 0, r> r’},∀t,∀i,∀w. (A55)
∂Ly
∂Vrtnmw
= bnm(ρθrtnw − ρθrtmw)− ηVrtnmw + φSDrtwFnm = 0 ∀r,∀t,∀n,∀m,∀w. (A56)
∂Ly
∂Vrtnmw
= −bnm(ρθrtnw − ρθrtmw)− ηVrytnmw + φSDrtwFnm = 0 ∀r,∀t,∀n,∀m,∀w. (A57)
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∂Ly
∂ζrtnw
= ρθrtnw − ηζrtnw + φSDrtwpi = 0∀r,∀t,∀n,∀w. (A58)
∂Ly
∂ζ
rtnw
= −ρθrtnw − ηζrtnw + φSDrtwpi = 0∀r,∀t,∀n,∀w. (A59)
∂Ly
∂ζrtnw
= ρθrtnw − ∑
w’(w,w’⊂{qw’r=qw’r})ρ
θ
rtnw’ = 0∀r,∀t,∀n,∀w. (A60)
∂Ly
∂ζ1rtw
= ρθryt(n=1)w = 0∀r,∀t,∀w. (A61)
Appendix A.3.3. Complementary Constraints
Complementary constraints of inequality equations related to the new first level model are as
follows. It is worth mentioning that each complementary constraint in the form of 0 ≤ x ⊥ y ≥ 0 is
equivalent to xy=0 and x>=0, y>=0 so that these kinds of equations have high non-convergence.
Complementary constraints of Equations (7)–(10):
0 ≤ (Ky −∑
r
( 1
1+ f)r∑i KyriXyri −∑r’ ( 11+ f)r’∑i ∑r’ Kyr’iXryrr’i) ⊥ ∆y ≥ 0 ∀y. (A62)
0 ≤ bSyrtiw ⊥ ηrytiw ≥ 0 ∀y,∀r,∀t,∀i,∀w. (A63)
0 ≤ bEyrtkw ⊥ ηrytkw ≥ 0 ∀y,∀r,∀t,∀k,∀w. (A64)
0 ≤ bsryrr’tiw ⊥ ηsrrr’ytiw ≥ 0 ∀y,∀r,∀r’ ⊂ {Xr’i > 0, r> r’},∀t,∀i,∀w. (A65)
The new first-level inequality constraints (Equations (A9)–(A14)):
0 ≤ qSyrtiw ⊥ µS′rytiw ≥ 0 ∀y,∀i,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A66)
0 ≤ ((1−VFC)Xyri − qSyrtiw) ⊥ µS′rytiw ≥ 0 ∀y,∀i,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A67)
0 ≤ qryrr’itw ⊥ µSr’yrtiw ≥ 0 ∀y,∀r,∀r’ ⊂ {Xr’s > 0, r> r’},∀t,∀i,∀w. (A68)
0 ≤ ((1−VFC)Xryrr’i − qsryrr’itw) ⊥ µSr’yrtiw ≥ 0 ∀y,∀r,∀r’ ⊂ {Xr’s > 0, r> r’},∀t,∀i,∀w. (A69)
0 ≤ (LCO2t − σrt[∑
y
∑
i
qCO2i q
S
yrtiw −∑
y
∑
r’
∑
i
qCO2i q
Sr
yrr’tiw −∑
y
∑
k
qCO2k q
E
yrtkw
−∑
y
∑
i
qCO2i V
FCXyri −∑
y
∑
r’
∑
i
qCO2i V
FCXryrr’i]) ⊥ µ′CO2rtw ≥ 0 ∀r,∀t,∀w. (A70)
0 ≤ qEyrtkw ⊥ µE’yrtkw ≥ 0 ∀y,∀k,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A71)
0 ≤ (qEyk − qEyrtkw) ⊥ µE’yrtkw ≥ 0 ∀y,∀k,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A72)
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0 ≤ qDrtdw ⊥ µD′rtdw ≥ 0 ∀d,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A73)
0 ≤ (qwrqDtd) ⊥ µD′rtdw ≥ 0 ∀d,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A74)
0 ≤ bnm(θrtnw − θrtmw)+ Fnm ⊥ Vrtnmw ≥ 0 ∀n,∀m,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A75)
0 ≤ Fnm − bnm(θrtnw − θrtmw) ⊥ V′rtnmw ≥ 0 ∀n,∀m,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A76)
0 ≤ (θrtnw +pi) ⊥ ζ′rtnw ≥ 0 ∀n,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A77)
0 ≤ (pi − θrtnw) ⊥ ζ′rtnw ≥ 0 ∀n,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A78)
Complementary constraints related to dual variables (Equations (A21)–(A27)):
0 ≤ µS
yrtiw
⊥ ηS
rytiw
≥ 0, 0 ≤ µSyrtiw ⊥ ηSrytiw ≥ 0, ∀y,∀i,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A79)
0 ≤ µsr
yrr’tiw
⊥ ηsr
rr’ytiw
≥ 0, 0 ≤ µsryrr’tiw ⊥ ηsrrr’ytiw ≥ 0∀y,∀r,∀r’ ⊂ {Xr’s > 0, r> r’},∀t,∀i,∀w. (A80)
0 ≤ µE
yrtkw
⊥ ηE
rytkw
≥ 0, 0 ≤ µEyrtkw ⊥ ηErytkw ≥ 0, ∀y,∀k,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A81)
0 ≤ µD
rtdw
⊥ ηD
rtdw
≥ 0, 0 ≤ µDrtdw ⊥ ηDrtdw ≥ 0, ∀d,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A82)
0 ≤ Vrtnmw ⊥ ηVrtnmw ≥ 0, 0 ≤ Vrtnmw ⊥ ηVrtnmw ≥ 0, ∀r,∀t,∀n,∀m,∀w. (A83)
0 ≤ µCO2rtw ⊥ µ′CO2 ≥ 0, ∀r,∀t,∀w. (A84)
0 ≤ ζ
rtnw
⊥ ηζ
rytnw
≥ 0, 0 ≤ ζrtnw ⊥ ηζrytnw ≥ 0, ∀r,∀t,∀n,∀w. (A85)
Appendix A.4. Linearization Related to Equivalent MINLP Problem of the DCC-EPEC Model
An MINLP model is obtained resulting from applying primal-dual transformation in addition to
KKT conditions for the DCC-EPEC model. Three groups of final constraints are nonlinear.
• The complementary constraints of Equations (A62)–(A85).
For linearizing the obtained complementary constraint, a different approach can be used. The first
approach frequently used in recent research is big-M reformulation. This approach is used to
linearize without approximation [65]. Choosing the amount of M is such a challenging issue
that the authors in [66] pay attention to overcoming this problem. In this approach, the obtained
complementary constraint in the form of 0 ≤ x ⊥ y ≥ 0 is equivalent to x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, x ≤ MO and y≤ M(1-O) so that O and M are binary variables and a constant big amount. Another approach
without approximation is an SOS1-based one. In this approach, x + y = s1 + s2 and x − y = s1 − s2
so that s1 and s2 are SOS1 variables [67]. This solution is so costly for large scale models that
another approach which uses approximation has emerged. In this approach, SOS1 variables are
relaxed to non-negative ones, leading to considering the term −b(s1 + s2) in an objective function
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to be penalized [67]. However, choosing the amount of b is also assumed to be an issue. In this
paper, big-M reformulation is used to linearize.
• Dual theory constraint (Equation (A6)): The dual theory constraint obtained from primal-dual
transform is nonlinear due to multiplication of continuous variables. On the other hand,
owing to the fact that this equation is equivalent to the set of complimentary constraints
using KKT conditions, dual theory constraints are replaced with equivalent constraints.
Afterwards, the equivalent complementary constraints are linearized using the explanations
of the previous part:
0 ≤ qSyrtiw ⊥ µSyrtiw ≥ 0, ∀y,∀i,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A86)
0 ≤ ((1−VFC)Xyri − qSyrtiw) ⊥ µSyrtiw ≥ 0, ∀y,∀i,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A87)
0 ≤ qsryrr’tiw ⊥ µsryrtiw ≥ 0, ∀y,∀r,∀r’ ⊂ {Xr’s > 0, r>r’},∀t,∀i,∀w. (A88)
0 ≤ ((1−VFC)Xryrr’i − qsryrr’itw) ⊥ µsryrtiw ≥ 0, ∀y,∀r,∀r’ ⊂ {Xr’s > 0, r>r’},∀t,∀i,∀w. (A89)
0 ≤ (LCO2t − σrt[∑
y
∑
i
qCO2i q
S
yrtiw −∑
y
∑
r’
∑
i
qCO2i q
Sr
yrr’tiw −∑
y
∑
k
qCO2k q
E
yrtkw−∑
y
∑
i
qCO2i V
FCXyri
−∑
y
∑
r’
∑
i
qCO2i V
FCXryrr’i]) ⊥ µCO2rtw ≥ 0 ∀r,∀t,∀w.
(A90)
0 ≤ qEyrtkw ⊥ µEyrtkw ≥ 0, ∀y,∀k,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A91)
0 ≤ (qEyk − qEyrtkw) ⊥ µEyrtkw ≥ 0, ∀y,∀k,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A92)
0 ≤ qDrtdw ⊥ µDrtdw ≥ 0, ∀d,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A93)
0 ≤ (qwrqDtd) ⊥ µDrtdw ≥ 0, ∀d,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A94)
0 ≤ bnm(θrtnw − θrtmw)+ Fnm ⊥ Vrtnmw ≥ 0, ∀n,∀m,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A95)
0 ≤ Fnm − bnm(θrtnw − θrtmw) ⊥ Vrtnmw ≥ 0, ∀n,∀m,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A96)
0 ≤ θrtnw +pi ⊥ ζrtnw ≥ 0, ∀n,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A97)
0 ≤ pi − θrtnw ⊥ ζrtnw ≥ 0, ∀n,∀t,∀r,∀w. (A98)
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• Equations that have φSdrtw:
Due to the fact that MPEC obtained is not convex, the amount of dual variables is not unique;
consequently, dual variable (φSdrtw) can be parameterized to a specific value.
References
1. Ghalebani, A.; Das, T.K. Design of Financial Incentive Programs to Promote Net Zero Energy Buildings.
IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2017, 32, 75–84.
2. Movahednasab, A.; Rashidinejad, M.; Abdollahi, A. A system dynamics analysis of the long run investment
in market based electric generation expansion with renewable resources. Int. Trans. Electr. Energy Syst. 2017,
27, e2338.
3. Marzband, M.; Azarinejadian, F.; Savaghebi, M.; Pouresmaeil, E.; M.Guerrero, J.; Lightbody, G. Smart
transactive energy framework in grid-connected multiple home microgrids under independent and coalition
operations. Renew. Energy 2018, 126, 95–106.
4. Qiu, J.; Yang, H.; Dong, Z.Y.; Zhao, J.H.; Meng, K.; Luo, F.J.; Wong, K.P. A Linear Programming Approach to
Expansion Co-Planning in Gas and Electricity Markets. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2016, 31, 3594–3606.
5. Dehghan, S.; Amjady, N.; Conejo, A.J. Reliability-Constrained Robust Power System Expansion Planning.
IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2016, 31, 2383–2392.
6. Noz Delgado, G.M.; Contreras, J.; Arroyo, J.M. Multistage Generation and Network Expansion Planning in
Distribution Systems Considering Uncertainty and Reliability. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2016, 31, 3715–3728.
7. Valinejad, J.; Barforoshi, T.; Marzband, M.; Pouresmaeil, E.; Godina, R.; ao P. S. Catalão, J. Investment
Incentives in Competitive Electricity Markets. Appl. Sci. 2018, 8, 1–23.
8. Park, H.; Baldick, R. Stochastic Generation Capacity Expansion Planning Reducing Greenhouse Gas
Emissions. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2015, 30, 1026–1034.
9. Shu, J.; Wu, L.; Zhang, L.; Han, B. Spatial Power Network Expansion Planning Considering Generation
Expansion. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2015, 30, 1815–1824.
10. Tavakoli, M.; Shokridehaki, F.; Akorede, M.F.; Marzband, M.; Vechiu, I.; Pouresmaeil, E. CVaR-based energy
management scheme for optimal resilience and operational cost in commercial building microgrids. Int. J.
Electr. Power Energy Syst. 2018, 100, 1–9.
11. Xu, Y.; Huang, C.; Chen, X.; Mili, L.; Tong, C.H.; Korkali, M.; Min, L. Response-Surface-Based Bayesian
Inference for Power System Dynamic Parameter Estimation. IEEE Trans. Smart Grid 2018, 10, 5899–5909.
12. Ameli, A.; Farrokhifard, M.; Ahmadifar, A.; Haghifam, M. Distributed generation planning based on the
distribution company’s and the DG owner’s profit maximization. Int. Trans. Electr. Energy Syst. 2013, 25,
216–232.
13. Valinejad, J.; Marzband, M.; Korkali, M.; Xu, Y.; Sumaiti, A.S.A. Hierarchical Interactive Architecture based
on Coalition Formation for Neighborhood System Decision Making. arXiv 2019, arXiv:1910.07039.
14. Barati, F.; Seifi, H.; Sepasian, M.S.; Nateghi, A.; Shafie-khah, M.; Catalão, J.P.S. Multi-Period Integrated
Framework of Generation, Transmission, and Natural Gas Grid Expansion Planning for Large-Scale Systems.
IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2015, 30, 2527–2537.
15. Valinejad, J.; Oladi, Z.; Barforoushi, T.; Parvaniac, M. Stochastic Unit Commitment in the Presence of
Demand Response Program under Uncertainties. Int. J. Eng. 2017, 30, 1134–1143.
16. Marzband, M.; Fouladfar, M.H.; Akorede, M.F.; Lightbody, G.; Pouresmaeil, E. Framework for smart
transactive energy in home-microgrids considering coalition formation and demand side management.
Sustain. Cities Soc. 2018, 40, 136–154.
17. Marzband, M.; Javadi, M.; Pourmousavi, S.A.; Lightbody, G. An advanced retail electricity market for active
distribution systems and home microgrid interoperability based on game theory. Electr. Power Syst. Res.
2018, 157, 187–199.
18. Liu, G.; Wen, F.; MacGill, I. Optimal timing for generation investment with uncertain emission mitigation
policy. Eur. Trans. Electr. Power 2010, 21, 1015–1027.
19. Gil, E.; Aravena, I.; Cárdenas, R. Generation Capacity Expansion Planning Under Hydro Uncertainty Using
Stochastic Mixed Integer Programming and Scenario Reduction. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2015, 30, 1838–1847.
Energies 2019, 12, 4813 33 of 35
20. Quintero, J.; Zhang, H.; Chakhchoukh, Y.; Vittal, V.; Heydt, G.T. Next, Generation Transmission Expansion
Planning Framework: Models, Tools, and Educational Opportunities. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2014,
29, 1911–1918.
21. Jabr, R.A. Robust Transmission Network Expansion Planning With Uncertain Renewable Generation and
Loads. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2013, 28, 4558–4567.
22. Han, C.; Hur, D.; Sohn, J.; Park, J. Assessing impacts of capacity mechanism on long term market equilibrium.
Eur. Trans. Electr. Power 2009, 20, 218–230.
23. Han, C.K.; Hur, D.; Sohn, J.M.; Park, J.K. Assessing the Impacts of Capacity Mechanisms on Generation
Adequacy With Dynamic Simulations. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2011, 26, 1788–1797.
24. Dent, C.J.; Bialek, J.W.; Hobbs, B.F. Opportunity Cost Bidding by Wind Generators in Forward Markets:
Analytical Results. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2011, 26, 1600–1608.
25. Doorman, G.L.; Botterud, A. Analysis of Generation Investment Under Different Market Designs. IEEE Trans.
Power Syst. 2008, 23, 859–867.
26. Lee, Y.Y.; Baldick, R.; Hur, J. Firm-Based Measurements of Market Power in Transmission-Constrained
Electricity Markets. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2011, 26, 1962–1970.
27. Alvarez, F.; Rudnick, H. Impact of Energy Efficiency Incentives on Electricity Distribution Companies.
IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2010, 25, 1865–1872.
28. Tavakoli, M.; Shokridehaki, F.; Mousa Marzband, R.G.; Pouresmaeil, E. A two stage hierarchical control
approach for the optimal energy management in commercial building microgrids based on local wind power
and PEVs. Sustain. Cities Soc. 2018, 41, 332–340.
29. Soder, L. Analysis of Pricing and Volumes in Selective Capacity Markets. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2010,
25, 1415–1422.
30. Vazquez, C.; Rivier, M.; Perez-Arriaga, I.J. A market approach to long-term security of supply. IEEE Trans.
Power Syst. 2002, 17, 349–357.
31. Li, F.; Tolley, D.; Padhy, N.P.; Wang, J. Framework for Assessing the Economic Efficiencies of Long-Run
Network Pricing Models. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2009, 24, 1641–1648.
32. Kockar, I.; Galiana, F.D. Combined pool/bilateral dispatch. II. Curtailment of firm and nonfirm contracts.
IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2002, 17, 1184–1190.
33. Careri, F.; Genesi, C.; Marannino, P.; Montagna, M.; Rossi, S.; Siviero, I. Generation Expansion Planning in
the Age of Green Economy. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2011, 26, 2214–2223.
34. Saboori, H.; Hemmati, R. Considering Carbon Capture and Storage in Electricity Generation Expansion
Planning. IEEE Trans. Sustain. Energy 2016, 7, 1371.
35. Valinejad, J.; Firouzifar, S.; Marzband, M.; Al-Sumaiti, A.S. Reconsidering insulation coordination and
simulation under the effect of pollution due to climate change. Int. Trans. Electr. Energy Syst. 2018, 28, e2595.
36. Kazempour, S.J.; Conejo, A.J.; Ruiz, C. Strategic Generation Investment Using a Complementarity Approach.
IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2011, 26, 940–948.
37. Kazempour, S.J.; Conejo, A.J. Strategic Generation Investment Under Uncertainty Via Benders
Decomposition. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2012, 27, 424–432.
38. Valinejad, J.; Marzband, M.; Akorede, M.F.; Elliott, I.D.; Godina, R.; Matias, J.; Pouresmaeil, E. Long-term
decision on wind investment with considering different load ranges of power plant for sustainable electricity
energy market. Sustainability 2018, 10, 3811.
39. Kazempour, S.J.; Conejo, A.J.; Ruiz, C. Generation investment equilibria with strategic producer—Part I.
IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2013, 28, 2613–2622.
40. Kazempour, S.J.; Conejo, A.J.; Ruiz, C. Generation Investment Equilibria With Strategic Producers—Part II:
Case Studies. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2013, 28, 2623–2631.
41. Wogrin, S.; Barquín, J.; Centeno, E. Capacity Expansion Equilibria in Liberalized Electricity Markets:
An EPEC Approach. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2013, 28, 1531–1539.
42. Valinejad, J.; Marzband, M.; Barforoushi, T.; Kyyra¨, J.; Pouresmaeil, E. Dynamic stochastic EPEC model
for Competition of Dominant Producers in Generation Expansion Planning. In Proceedings of the
5th International Symposium on Environment Friendly Energies and Applications (EFEA), Rome, Italy,
24–26 September 2018.
Energies 2019, 12, 4813 34 of 35
43. Valinejad, J.; Marzband, M.; Akorede, M.F.; Barforoshi, T.; Jovanovic´, M. Generation expansion planning in
electricity market considering uncertainty in load demand and presence of strategic GENCOs. Electr. Power
Syst. Res. 2017, 152, 92–104.
44. Taheri, S.S.; Kazempour, J.; Seyedshenava, S. Transmission expansion in an oligopoly considering generation
investment equilibrium. Energy Econ. 2017, 64, 55–62.
45. Pozo, D.; Sauma, E.E.; Contreras, J. A Three-Level Static MILP Model for Generation and Transmission
Expansion Planning. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2013, 28, 202–210.
46. Hesamzadeh, M.R.; Yazdani, M. Transmission Capacity Expansion in Imperfectly Competitive Power
Markets. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2014, 29, 62–71.
47. Jin, S.; Ryan, S.M. A Tri-Level Model of Centralized Transmission and Decentralized Generation Expansion
Planning for an Electricity Market—Part I: Formulation. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2014, 29, 132–141.
48. Jin, S.; Ryan, S.M. A Tri-Level Model of Centralized Transmission and Decentralized Generation Expansion
Planning for an Electricity Market—Part II: Case Studies. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2014, 29, 142–168.
49. Valinejad, J.; Marzband, M.; Xu, Y.; Uppal, H.; Al-Sumaiti, A.S.; Barforoshi, T. Dynamic behavior of
multi-carrier energy market in view of investment incentives. Electr. Eng. 2019, 101, 1033–1051.
50. Barforoushi, T.; Moghaddam, M.P.; Javidi, M.H.; Sheikh-El-Eslami, M.K. Evaluation of Regulatory Impacts on
Dynamic Behavior of Investments in Electricity Markets: A New Hybrid DP/GAME Framework. IEEE Trans.
Power Syst. 2010, 25, 1978–1986.
51. Niu, H.; Baldick, R.; Zhu, G. Supply function equilibrium bidding strategies with fixed forward contracts.
IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2005, 20, 1859–1867.
52. van Stiphout, A.; Vos, K.D.; Deconinck, G. The Impact of Operating Reserves on Investment Planning of
Renewable Power Systems. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2017, 32, 378–388.
53. Zhao, F.; Luh, P.B.; Yan, J.H.; Stern, G.A.; Chang, S.C. Payment Cost Minimization Auction for Deregulated
Electricity Markets With Transmission Capacity Constraints. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2008, 23, 532–544.
54. Valinejad, J.; Barforoushi, T. Generation expansion planning in electricity markets: A novel framework based
on dynamic stochastic MPEC. Int. J. Electr. Power Energy Syst. 2015, 70, 108–117.
55. Valinejad, J.; Marzband, M.; Busawona, K.; Kyyra¨, J.; Pouresmaeil, E. Investigating Wind Generation
Investment Indices in Multi-Stage Planning. In Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on
Environment Friendly Energies and Applications (EFEA), Rome, Italy, 24–26 September 2018.
56. Vasquez, J.; Guerrero, J.; Savaghebi, M.; Eloy-Garcia, J.; Teodorescu, R. Modeling, Analysis, and Design of
Stationary-Reference-Frame Droop-Controlled Parallel Three-Phase Voltage Source Inverters. IEEE Trans.
Ind. Electron. 2013, 60, 1271–1280.
57. Bauso, D. Game Theory: Models, Numerical Methods and Applications; Now Publishers: Delft, The Netherlands, 2014.
58. Birge, J.R.; Louveaux, F. Introduction to Stochastic Programming; Springer: Cham, Switzerland, 2011.
59. Xu, Y.; Mili, L.; Sandu, A.; von Spakovsky, M.R.; Zhao, J. Propagating Uncertainty in Power System Dynamic
Simulations Using Polynomial Chaos. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2018, 34, 338–348.
60. Conejo, A.J.; Morales, M.C.J.M. Decision Making under Uncertainty in Electricity Markets; Springer: Cham,
Switzerland, 2010.
61. Shabani, A.; Hosseini, H.; Karegar, H.K.; Jalilzadeh, S. Optimal generation expansion planning in IPP
presence with HCGA. In Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE 2nd International Power and Energy Conference,
Johor Bahru, Malaysia, 1–3 December 2008; pp. 143–147.
62. Nualhong, D.; Chusanapiputt, S.; Jantarang, S.; Pungprasert, V. Generation Expansion Planning
Including Biomass Energy Sources with Global Environmental Consideration Using Improved Tabu
Search. In Proceedings of the TENCON 2005—2005 IEEE Region 10 Conference, Melbourne, Australia,
21–24 November 2005; pp. 1–5.
63. Xu, Y.; Mili, L. Probabilistic Power Flow Analysis based on the Adaptive Polynomial Chaos-ANOVA Method.
In Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM), Portland, OR, USA,
5–10 August 2018.
64. Xu, Y.; Mili, L.; Zhao, J. Probabilistic Power Flow Calculation and Variance Analysis based on Hierarchical
Adaptive Polynomial Chaos-ANOVA Method. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2019, 34, 3316–3325.
65. Fortuny-Amat, J.; McCarl, B. A representation and economic interpretation of a two-level programming
problem. J. Oper. Res. Soc. 1981, 32, 783–792.
Energies 2019, 12, 4813 35 of 35
66. Moiseeva, E.; Hesamzadeh, M.R. Strategic Bidding of a Hydropower Producer under Uncertainty: Modified
Benders Approach. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 2018, 33, 861–873.
67. Siddiqui, S.; Gabriel, S.A. An SOS1-based approach for solving MPECs with a natural gas market application.
Netw. Spat. Econ. 2013, 13, 205–227.
© 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
